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DRAFTING LESSONS FROM THE RECENT PAST:
AVOIDING THE PITFALLS OF RECENT LITIGANTS WHEN DRAFTING ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS
By
Shari Maynard*
∗

I.   INTRODUCTION
The resolution of civil disputes through arbitration has become prominent.1 This
is partly attributable to the desirability of adjudicating disputes in arbitration rather than
litigation. Arbitration boasts efficiency, adjudicators who are experts in their field, costs
relatively lower than litigation, and a private forum in which parties can preserve
confidentiality.2 Moreover, “arbitration is a matter of contract.”3 As such, parties are
generally free to tailor their arbitral process to suit their needs.4
Although these aspects of arbitration are quite attractive, other features of the
process illustrate the importance of drafting a sound arbitration agreement. In most cases,
arbitration is final and binding and appeal is permissible only in truly exceptional
circumstances.5 Arbitration may also become costly where parties contest the validity of
an arbitration agreement in court.6 Moreover, contesting an arbitration agreement in court
prolongs the proceeding and invites potentially unsavory interference into the arbitral
process.7 With this much at stake, a well-drafted arbitration agreement is essential. In
addition to avoiding the above consequences, a skillfully written arbitral agreement
expedites the process, eliminates needless confusion, provides the arbitrator with clear
rules, and honors the parties’ intent to arbitrate.
Moreover, there is an “emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute
resolution.”8 Consistent with this policy, arbitration agreements are presumptively
*
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See Georgios I. Zekos, Constitutionality of Commercial/Maritime Arbitration, 45 J. MAR. L. & COM. 35,
38 (2014) (discussing the prevalence of arbitration).
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See Christopher R. Drahozal, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J.
DISP. RESOL. 433, 451-52 (2010).
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Flintkote Co. v. Aviva PLC, 769 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Bel-Ray Co., Inc. v. Chemrite (Pty)
Ltd., 181 F.3d 435, 444 (3d Cir. 1999)).
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enforceable.9 This favor is generous, but not unconditional. Under the FAA, a court may
invalidate an arbitration agreement “on such grounds as exist in law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.”10 These grounds include “generally applicable contract
defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.”11 Additionally, courts may vacate
arbitral awards in some circumstances, such as when an arbitrator exceeds his authority.12
There has been no shortage of recent cases in which drafting deficiencies in
arbitration agreements caused extensive litigation, leading parties to seek invalidation of
their arbitral clause or vacatur of the arbitrator’s award. Accordingly, this article will
explore recent court decisions from United States jurisdictions where deficient arbitration
agreements resulted in litigation because of issues that could have been prevented at the
drafting stage. The primary focus is on assessing the mistakes these litigants made and
proposing ways for future drafters to avoid the same missteps. Part II is organized in
accordance with the deficiencies courts have recently found in arbitration agreements:
general contract defenses (namely, unconscionability and lack of mutuality); equitable
estoppel; ambiguous or otherwise poorly written clauses; and excess of authority. After a
critical discussion of recent cases, Part III addresses strategies future drafters may employ
to avoid the pitfalls examined. In this section, the arbitral clauses discussed are rewritten
where particularly instructive.
There is no foolproof method to prevent future disputes regarding an arbitration
agreement or ensure its enforcement if challenged. However, assessing the costly
mistakes of past litigants and taking practical steps to avoid them significantly
strengthens one’s own agreement and decreases the likelihood of tedious disagreements
and their attendant detriments in the future.

9

See Milloul v. Knight Capital Grp., Inc., No. A-1953-13T2, 2015 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2115, at *10
(N.J. Super. App. Div. Sept. 1, 2015).
10

Venture Cotton Coop. v. Freeman, 435 S.W.3d 222, 227 (Tex. 2014) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2).
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10(a)(4)).
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II.  DRAFTING DEFICIENCIES
COURT DECISIONS

OF

ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS

AS

DISCUSSED

IN

RECENT

A.   General Contract Defenses

1.   Unconscionability
Unconscionability is one of the most common grounds on which parties challenge
the validity of arbitration agreements.13 It has two forms: procedural and substantive.14
Procedural unconscionability concerns the manner in which the agreement was formed.15
In this respect, the emphasis is on whether there was oppression arising from an
“inequality of bargaining power,” or surprise arising from the inconspicuous nature of the
arbitral agreement.16 Factors that contribute to procedural unconscionability include
adhesiveness and conspicuousness of the agreement.17 Substantive unconscionability
concerns the content of the agreement, specifically whether the terms produce “overly
harsh or one-sided results.”18 Imposition of significant costs on the weaker party and
designation of an arbitrator with a conflict of interest are examples of substantively
unconscionable terms.19 Courts typically assess the substantive and procedural aspects of
an agreement independently to determine whether it is unconscionable.20 Numerous
drafting errors can contribute to a finding of unconscionability. An assessment of recent
cases involving unconscionability challenges to the enforcement of arbitration
agreements is illustrative.
In Caplin Enters. v. Arrington, the plaintiffs signed one of two versions of an
arbitration clause, one old and one new, as part of their contractual agreement with Zippy
Check, a check cashing business.21 When the plaintiffs brought suit alleging that Zippy
Check engaged in fraudulent misrepresentation and predatory lending, the business
13

Nicole F. Munro & Peter L. Cockrell, Drafting Arbitration Agreements: A Practitioner's Guide for
Consumer Credit Contracts, 8 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 363, 366 (2013).
14

Caplin Enters. v. Arrington, 145 So.3d 608, 614 (Miss. 2014).

15

See Ortiz v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 3d 1070, 1077 (2014); see also Munro & Cockrell,
supra note 13, at 367.
16

See Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 109 F. Supp. 3d 1185, 1205 (N.D. Cal. 2015); see also Ortiz, 52 F.
Supp. 3d at 1077.
17

See Mohamed, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1205; see also Munro & Cockrell, supra note 13, at 368.

18

Ortiz, 52 F. Supp. 3d at 1077; see also Mohamed, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1207.

19

See State ex rel. Hewitt v. Kerr, 461 S.W.3d 798, 812 (Mo. 2015); see also Munro & Cockrell, supra
note 13, at 369.
20

Ortiz, 52 F. Supp. 3d at 1077; Eaton v. CMH Homes, Inc., 461 S.W.3d 426, 433 (Mo. 2015).

21

Caplin, 145 So. 3d at 611.
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moved to compel arbitration while the plaintiffs asserted that the agreement was
unconscionable.22
The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.23 Procedurally, the old version
constituted “several unnumbered paragraphs in fine print.”24 Substantively, the agreement
permitted the defendant to “pursue all judicial remedies to collect on the debt” yet
required that the plaintiffs arbitrate all of their claims.25 Further, under the agreement,
Zippy Check’s liability could not exceed the amount that the plaintiffs paid for its
services, which ranged from $65 to $72.26 Because the costs of arbitration would have
likely exceeded these amounts, Zippy Check effectually drafted the agreement to ensure
that its liability would be so “nominal that it has the practical effect of avoiding almost all
responsibility for a breach.”27 The newer version of the agreement was similarly
deficient.28
Hewitt presents another opportunity to assess drafting errors that contribute to
unconscionability.29 The plaintiff, Todd Hewitt, was employed by the St. Louis Rams, an
affiliate of the National Football League (“NFL”).30 His employment contract included an
arbitration clause, which stated that the plaintiff was “legally bound by the Constitution
and By-Laws and Rules and Regulations of the National Football League and by the
decisions of the Commissioner.”31 The stated rules gave the NFL commissioner “full,
complete, and final jurisdiction and authority to arbitrate.”32 When plaintiff was informed
that his employment contract would not be renewed, he brought suit against his employer
alleging age discrimination under the Missouri Human Rights Act.33 The plaintiff argued
that the arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable because it was adhesive
and offered to him hurriedly.34 The plaintiff also argued that the agreement was
substantively unconscionable because it did not specifically provide for the arbitration of

22

Caplin,145 So. 3d at 613.
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Id. at 617.

24

Id. at 611.
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Id. at 616.
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Id. at 617.
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Caplin,145 So. 3d at 617.
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Id.
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Hewitt, 461 S.W.3d 798.
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Id. at 803.
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Id. at 803-04.

32

Id. at 823.

33

Id. at 804.

34

Hewitt, 461 S.W.3d at 804.
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statutory rights, did not state or describe the arbitration guidelines, and designated the
NFL commissioner as sole arbitrator.35
The court concluded that the agreement was not procedurally unconscionable
because procedural unconscionability requires more than “inequality in bargaining
power.”36However, the court found that the agreement was substantively
unconscionable.37 The arbitral contract encompassed “any dispute” between the parties
and this broad language included statutory claims.38 No arbitration guidelines were
incorporated into the agreement because the guidelines were not clearly identified and
described.39 Furthermore, the appointment of the commissioner as sole arbitrator was
one-sided because the commissioner, as an NFL employee, was in “a position of bias”
that could unfairly prejudice the plaintiff in the arbitral proceeding.40
Yet another example of an arbitral agreement challenged on unconscionability
grounds is the agreement at issue in Gutierrez v. Carter Bros. Sec. Servs. LLC.41 There,
Carter Brothers employed the plaintiffs to install AT&T security systems.42 Plaintiffs
were required to sign an “Independent Contractor Agreement” that included an
arbitration clause.43 They later brought suit, arguing that the defendants required them to
sign the agreement to avoid the legal consequences of deeming them employees.44 The
defendants moved to compel arbitration, resulting in the plaintiffs’ claim that the contract
was unconscionable.45
In denying the defendant’s motion, the court found that the arbitration agreement
was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable and therefore invalid.46
Procedurally, the agreement was adhesive: it was offered to plaintiffs as a condition of
employment, with no opportunity for negotiation or modification.47 Substantively, the
plaintiffs, who lived and worked in California, were required to travel to Atlanta and

35

Hewitt, 461 S.W.3d at 804.

36

Id. at 809-10.

37

Id. at 814.

38

Id.
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Id. at 811.
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Hewitt, 461 S.W.3d at 813.
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Gutierrez v. Carter Bros. Sec. Servs., LLC, 63 F. Supp. 3d 1206 (E.D. Cal. 2014).
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Id. at 1209.
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Id. at 1209-10.
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Id. at 1209.
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Id. at 1210.
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Gutierrez, 63 F. Supp. 3d at 1210.
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evenly split the costs of arbitration with the defendants.48 Because the costs of complying
with these two financial requirements would likely exceed the plaintiffs’ maximum
potential recovery, the agreement effectively barred the plaintiffs from resolving their
claims and was therefore substantively unconscionable.49
In each of these cases, it is evident that the drafters of the arbitration agreements
at issue could have avoided litigation if they had removed or changed provisions that
could raise unconscionability concerns. In some cases, prominent display of the
arbitration agreement would have bolstered the defendant’s case, while in others,
including terms more considerate to the other parties’ financial constraints would have
gone a long way. These errors and their remedies will be addressed in Part III.
2.   Lack of Mutuality
Some courts require that when parties enter an arbitration agreement, the promise
to arbitrate must be mutually binding on all parties.50 Lack of mutuality is evident where
“one provision of a contract is inconsistent with the contract's arbitration clause and the
two cannot be harmonized”51 or “when one party retains the unilateral right to amend the
agreement and avoid its obligations.”52 In some jurisdictions, lack of mutuality is merely
one factor that courts consider in assessing substantive unconscionability.53 In others,
lack of mutuality alone is sufficient to invalidate an agreement.54 Because of this
difference in jurisdictional treatment, lack of mutuality will be considered separately
from unconscionability.
In Greene v. Alliance Auto, the plaintiff bought a vehicle from the defendant,
which the defendant later repossessed.55 In response to the plaintiff’s suit for damages,
the defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitral clause in the
purchase agreement.56 The plaintiff argued that the arbitral clause was unconscionable
because, among other things, a self-help provision undermined the defendant’s mutual
promise to arbitrate.57

48

Gutierrez, 63 F. Supp. 3d at 1214.

49

Id.

50

See Heather Bromfield, The Denial of Relief: The Enforcement of Class Action Waivers in Arbitration
Agreements, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 315, 320, 326-27 (2009).
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Alltel Corp. v. Rosenow, 2014 Ark. 375 at 8.
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Baker v. Bristol Care, Inc., 450 S.W.3d 770, 776 (Mo. 2014).

53

See, e.g., Eaton 461 S.W.3d at 434; see also Greene v. Alliance Auto., Inc., 435 S.W.3d 646 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2014) (finding that a lack of mutuality was one factor that rendered the arbitration agreement
unconscionable).
54
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Greene, 435 S.W.3d at 648.
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The court agreed, finding that the agreement lacked mutuality. The agreement
stated that “no party waives its right to elect arbitration . . . by exercising self-help
remedies.”58 Thus, despite requiring the plaintiff to arbitrate her disputes, the arbitral
clause allowed the defendant to seek arbitration and self-help simultaneously to remedy
the same harm suffered from the plaintiff’s alleged breach.59
In Baker v. Bristol Care, Inc., the plaintiff’s employment contract contained an
arbitration agreement stating that defendant employer “reserves the right to amend,
modify or revoke this agreement upon thirty (30) days' prior written notice to the
Employee.”60 When a dispute arose between the parties, the plaintiff sought litigation
while the defendant sought arbitration.61 The court found that the agreement lacked
mutuality, as the defendant retained the unilateral right to rescind its mutual agreement to
arbitrate.62 That a notice period was provided was immaterial, as this did not provide for
negotiation or consent from the plaintiff.63
Greene and Baker illustrate the drafting errors that can be made by a party who
desires arbitration only when an exit strategy is available. However, if arbitration is the
preferred mode of dispute resolution, this preference should be effectively reflected in the
arbitration agreement, sans language undermining arbitral intent.
B.  Equitable Estoppel
Equitable estoppel refers to the general rule that a non-signatory party will be
restricted from “embracing a contract” and later refusing to comply with the terms of that
contract in their entirety.64 In some instances, it is equitable to require a party to arbitrate
a dispute, although that party is not a signatory to an arbitration agreement, because that
party’s actions have indicated a desire to arbitrate.65 Equitable estoppel is not a defense to
the enforcement of arbitration agreements, as are the other grounds discussed here.
However, it can be asserted where the agreement by which the parties’ relationship was
governed was poorly drafted or should have been amended in light of changed
circumstances.
Flintkote v. Aviva effectively illustrates the relationship between the doctrine of
equitable estoppel and imprudent drafting.66 The plaintiff, a supplier of asbestos products,
58

Id. at 653-54.

59

Id.

60

Baker, 450 S.W.3d at 773.

61

Id.
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Id. at 777.
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Id.

64

Flintkote, 769 F.3d at 221.

65

Id. at 220.
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bought insurance policies from several London insurance carriers.67 After numerous
claims against the plaintiff arose, the plaintiff entered a settlement agreement (the
“Wellington Agreement”) with all of the insurance companies, save for the defendant.68
The agreement stipulated that disputes would be resolved in mediation, then arbitration if
mediation was unsuccessful.69 A separate mediation agreement existed, which did not
reference arbitration.70 The plaintiff and the defendant then entered an agreement
providing that future disputes would be resolved by litigation.71 When the relationship
between the plaintiff and the insurance companies deteriorated, the defendant aligned
with the companies subject to the Wellington Agreement by participating in their
mediation, retaining the same attorneys, and jointly requesting relief from the plaintiff.72
When the defendant later sought to litigate a dispute, the plaintiff moved to compel
arbitration, arguing that defendant was equitably bound to arbitrate under the Wellington
Agreement.73
Applying Delaware law, the court discussed two types of equitable estoppel.74
Under the “knowing exploitation” rule, “a non-signatory is equitably precluded from
embracing a contract and then turning its back on the portions of the contract, such as an
arbitration clause, that it finds distasteful.”75 Also, “when . . . by his conduct [a party]
intentionally or unintentionally leads another, in reliance upon that conduct, to change
position to his detriment” he is equitably estopped from renouncing the arbitration
agreement.76 The court did not compel arbitration.77 The court concluded that the
defendant did not “clear[ly] and convincing[ly]” embrace the Wellington Agreement
because it participated in mediation only.78 Also, because there was an unambiguous
contract requiring the defendant to litigate its claims against the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s
reliance on the defendant’s alignment with the other insurance companies was
unreasonable.79
67

Id. at 217.

68

Id.

69

Flintkote, 769 F.3d at 217.

70

Id. at 218.

71

Id.

72

Id. at 218-19.

73

Id. at 219.

74

Flintkote, 769 F.3d at 221.

75

Flintkote, 769 F.3d at 221.

76

Id. at 223.
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Id.
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Id. at 222.

79

Id. at 223.
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As is evident from the preceding discussion, equitable estoppel is difficult to
establish, particularly where there is a contrary written agreement. By pre-selecting
arbitration or amending the existing contract when the need arises, the drafter may avoid
the burden of compelling arbitration in this manner.
C.  Ambiguous and Otherwise Poorly Written Clauses

1.   Ambiguity
It is especially difficult to enforce an arbitration agreement if the court cannot
even understand it. Here is where the problem of ambiguity arises. In such cases, the
language of the arbitration agreement or one of its essential provisions is so unclear or
inconsistent that the meaning cannot be discerned and judicial enforcement becomes
futile.
Milloul v. Knight is instructive in this respect.80 In that case, the plaintiffemployee contended that the arbitration agreement, which defendant-employer required
all employees to sign, did not convey that the employee was relinquishing his right to
litigation of future disputes.81 The agreement stated, in part, that the employee agreed to:
settle any and all previously unasserted claims, disputes or controversies
arising out of or relating to my application for employment, my
employment or the cessation of my employment . . . by final and binding
arbitration . . . Such claims include but are not limited to claims under
federal, state and local statutory law or common law.82
The court found that the agreement was ambiguous and unenforceable.83
Although arbitration agreements must be “read liberally to find arbitrability if reasonably
possible,”84 such deference was unjustified in this instance because the agreement failed
to communicate that the employee was forfeiting his right to a trial and that
discrimination disputes were subject to arbitration.85
In PCH Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cas. & Sur., Inc., PCH and CSI entered a contractual
agreement under which CSI would provide PCH with administrative support services for

80

Milloul, 2015 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2115, at *1.

81

Id. at *2.

82

Milloul, 2015 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2115, at *6-7.

83

Id. at *20.

84

Id. at *10.

85

Id. at *19-20.
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PCH’s insurance liability programs.86 Their contract contained an arbitration agreement
stating, in part, that: “[a]ny disputes concerning any aspect of this agreement may be
submitted to binding arbitration. The prevailing party shall be entitled to recover all costs
incurred, including reasonable attorney's fees.”87 PCH later brought suit against CSI,
resulting in CSI’s motion to compel arbitration.88 CSI argued that the agreement
mandated arbitration of all disputes, while PCH contended that the language was
permissive and merely designated arbitration as an option for resolving future disputes.89
The court exhibited little sympathy for CSI’s position, noting that it would accord
the agreement its plain meaning.90 The provision was ambiguous because it could be
interpreted in more than one way.91 The court noted that if the agreement were deemed
permissive, then another provision permitting injunctive relief to enforce the agreement
would be moot.92 However, “as a general matter of contract law, the word ‘may’ is
viewed as a permissive term, particularly when used in contraposition to the word
shall.”93 Accordingly, the plainly permissive language of the agreement did not bind the
parties to arbitration.94
Knight and PCH Mut. Ins. Co. teach that inconsistency breeds ambiguity. This, in
turn, undermines the parties’ recourse to arbitration. With thorough drafting, however,
these errors can be excluded from the arbitration agreement.
2.   Otherwise Poorly Written Clauses
This catchall category concerns errors which may seem obvious or insignificant at
the drafting stage, but could become major sources of contention when a dispute actually
arises. Errors include referencing nonexistent rules and using awkward or peculiar
phrasing.
A drafting error of this nature led to bizarre results and extensive litigation when
the parties in Grelu Consulting, Inc. v. Patel attempted to enforce their arbitration
agreement.95 Four individuals entered a partnership agreement, which included an
86

PCH Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cas. & Sur., Inc., 750 F. Supp. 2d 125, 132 (D.D.C. 2010).

87

Id. at 143.

88

Id. at 129.

89

Id. at 143-44.

90

Id. at 142.

91

PCH Mut. Ins. Co., 750 F. Supp. 2d at 143.

92

Id. at 144.

93

PCH Mut. Ins. Co., 750 F. Supp. 2d at 144.

94

Id. at 149.

95

Grelu Consulting, Inc., v. Patel, No. A-3042-11T3, 2013 WL 2435348, at *1 (N.J. Super. App. Div. June
6, 2013).
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arbitration clause, for the purpose of purchasing two Dunkin’ Donuts franchises.96 The
partnership deteriorated.97 Resolution of the disputes began in court.98 However, three of
the partners, who had aligned together and were jointly represented by one firm, moved
to compel arbitration.99
Though the court granted the motion to compel arbitration, this did not end the
conundrum.100 The parties disagreed fundamentally about the meaning of the arbitrator
selection provision.101 That provision stated that “[e]ach party shall appoint one . . .
arbitrator, and such arbitrator shall appoint another arbitrator . . . [and] the decision of [a]
majority of such arbitrators . . . shall be conclusive upon the parties.”102 The plaintiffs
argued that “each party” was synonymous with “each partner,” while the defendant
argued that the phrase meant “each side” of the dispute.103The plaintiffs further
contended that the provision permitted each partner to appoint one arbitrator, who would
in turn appoint one arbitrator, for a total of eight arbitrators.104 The defendant vehemently
opposed this construction, arguing that the resultant panel would be skewed in the
plaintiffs’ favor.105 Instead, the defendant argued that the provision permitted the
plaintiffs to jointly appoint one arbitrator, the defendant to appoint one arbitrator, and a
court to appoint a third arbitrator, for a total of three arbitrators.106 The lower court
adopted the plaintiffs’ construction, much to the defendant’s dismay.107
On appeal, the court ruled in favor of the defendant, acknowledging that the
arbitration agreement “would certainly not win any awards for legal drafting.”108 Another
section of the agreement stated that “[i]f the arbitrator appointed shall fail, within ten (10)
days after the last of the arbitrators shall have been appointed, to select another
arbitrator,” then a court “shall be authorized and empowered to appoint such third
arbitrator.”109 The appellate court also noted that interpreting the provision as plaintiffs
96

Id. at *1.

97

Id.

98

Id. at *1-2.

99

Id. at *2.

100

Grelu Consulting, 2013 WL 2435348, at *2.

101

Id. at *5.

102

Id.

103

Id. at *3.

104

Grelu Consulting, 2013 WL 2435348, at *3-4.

105

Id. at *3.

106

Id. at *4.

107

Id.

108

Id. at *5.

109

Grelu Consulting, 2013 WL 2435348, at *7 (emphasis added by the court).
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desired would be prejudicial against the defendant and produce an “unusually large and,
consequently expensive” panel.110 Accordingly, the court modified the agreement to
require a three-member panel of arbitrators by making two changes.111 First, the court
added an “s” to the offending provision.112 Thus, instead of “[e]ach party shall appoint
one (1) such arbitrator, and such arbitrator shall appoint another arbitrator,” the provision
was changed to “[e]ach party shall appoint one (1) such arbitrator, and such arbitrators
shall appoint another arbitrator.”113 The court made similar changes to the section
addressing timely arbitrator appointments.114 Additionally, the court found that “party”
was synonymous with side.115
The magnitude of harm a drafter can cause by making a simple mistake or using
overcomplicated language in the agreement is evident from the preceding discussion. The
drafter must steer clear of these practices and implement more pragmatic techniques, as
will be discussed in Part III.
D.  Excess of Authority
Arbitrators may act contrary to the parties’ arbitration agreement by “decid[ing]
matters not properly before [them].”116 As previously noted, where an arbitrator exceeds
his authority in this way, a court may vacate the award.117 If an arbitration agreement is
drafted in a manner that fosters doubt about the extent of the arbitrator’s powers, an
excess of authority challenge is more probable.
Leshin v. Oliva presents a prime example.118 There, a couple organized a partially
revocable family trust governed by an arbitration agreement.119 When the wife died, the
husband set up separate trusts, one of which allotted certain property to the defendant
upon the husband’s death.120 The plaintiff was appointed as a successor trustee. When
the husband died, the defendant accused the plaintiff of improprieties.121 The result of the
110

Id. at *13.
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Id. at *10.

112

Id.
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Id.
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Grelu Consulting, 2013 WL 2435348, at *10.
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Id. at *13-14.
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Leshin v. Oliva, No. 04-14-00657-CV, 2015 WL 4554333, at *8 (Tex. App. San Antonio July 29, 2015).
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Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 671-72.
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Leshin, 2015 WL 4554333, at * 1.

119

Id. at *2.
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Id. at *3.

121

Id. at *3-4.
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requisite arbitration was a judgment against the plaintiff in his individual capacity.122 The
plaintiff brought suit seeking to vacate the award, arguing that the arbitrator exceeded his
authority by rendering a judgment against him in his individual rather than trustee
capacity.123 The defendants argued that the broad language of the agreement and its
reference to American Arbitration Association rules suggested that the plaintiff assented
to the arbitrator’s determination regarding arbitrability.124 This included whether the
plaintiff was personally bound by the agreement and was required to satisfy the judgment
from his personal funds.125
Ultimately, the court decided that the arbitrator exceeded his authority “by
implicitly determining [that the plaintiff], individually, was a party to the arbitration
agreement, and thereby bound by any award in his individual capacity.”126 In arriving at
this conclusion, the court emphasized that no language in the agreement clearly gave the
arbitrator the power to bind the plaintiff personally.127
Expressly defining the scope of the arbitrator’s authority in the arbitration
agreement reduces the probability of an excess of authority challenge. Though the drafter
should not overcomplicate the agreement by launching into copious detail, some
specificity is desirable, as this will maximize the chances that a challenged award will be
upheld.
III.  

A DRAFTER’S GUIDE TO AVOIDING THE PITFALLS OF RECENT LITIGANTS

A.  General Contract Defenses

1.   Unconscionability

a.   Procedural unconscionability
To draft an agreement devoid of procedural unconscionability, there are several
factors to consider. First, conspicuousness should be a top priority. If the arbitration
agreement is a clause within a larger contract, it should be placed somewhere noticeable

122

Id. at *5.
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Leshin, 2015 WL 4554333, at *6.
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Id. at *13.
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Id. at *13.
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Id. at *22.
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Id. at *22-23.
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to the reader, such as near the beginning of the contract.128 Also, the content of the
agreement must appear presentable to the reader.129 Fine print and jumbled or
unorganized text are unsuitable. A readable font, generous spacing, and separation by
sections, where appropriate, are optimal. Second, if the agreement is part of a larger
contract, other portions of the contract should draw attention to the arbitration agreement
by prompting the reader to review the arbitration clause.130 Finally, a signature line at the
end of the arbitration agreement to indicate that the signatory has read and understands
the agreement is invaluable, regardless of whether the arbitration agreement is embedded
in a larger contract.131
If negotiating the terms of a contract is impracticable or undesirable, as is often
the case with adhesive contracts, the party who has drafted the agreement should notify
the other party of its existence, explain its significance, and provide sufficient opportunity
for the other party to review, comment, and perhaps opt out.132
b.   Substantive unconscionability
Because substantive unconscionability concerns the terms of the agreement, the
drafter has considerable control over protecting the arbitration agreement against a
challenge on this basis. Provisions that impose one-sidedness, are particularly severe
when applied, or appear excessively beneficial to one party at the expense of another
should be excluded.
Specifically, the drafter should avoid provisions that impose all or a substantial
portion of the costs of arbitration on a party who is obviously in a weaker position. In
Gutierrez, for example, the employer should have paid all or a substantial portion of the
costs of arbitration, rather than attempting to impose half of this cost on the workers.133
The drafter may also include a provision waiving its right to recover costs and fees from
the party on whom the agreement is imposed.134
Furthermore, as was evident in Caplin135 and Gutierrez,136 the agreement should
not impose costs on a party when such costs would outweigh the party’s maximum
allowable recovery. Courts will likely interpret this tactic as a guise for avoiding liability
for a breach of the agreement. Accordingly, the drafter may ease the financial burden of
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arbitration on the other party by stipulating that the proceedings will occur in a forum that
is convenient for that party,137 and by including the above suggested provisions regarding
costs and fees.138
Finally, arbitrator selection clauses should either designate an arbitrator free of
any actual or apparent biases, or describe a process for selecting an impartial arbitrator.
For example, in Hewitt, where the defendant’s arbitration agreement designated its own
employee as sole arbitrator,139 the drafter could have instead selected a neutral party to
appoint an arbitrator, or permitted each party to select an arbitrator, who would then
jointly appoint a third neutral arbitrator.
2.   Lack of Mutuality
To eliminate lack of mutuality in the arbitration agreement, it is helpful to assess
the pitfalls of the drafters in Greene140 and Baker.141 Rather than permitting unilateral
recourse to remedy a breach of the contract, each provision of the arbitration agreement
should reflect both parties’ intent to arbitrate. A provision that permits the drafter to
pursue non-arbitral remedies without waiving the right to arbitrate should afford the other
party a comparable legal right, such as seeking injunctive relief or other equitable
remedies in court.142 If the drafter finds this consolation undesirable, then the drafter
should either eliminate the alternative remedies provision altogether or mitigate the
provision. For instance, a mitigated provision could provide that exercising alternative
remedies waives the right to arbitrate.
The following changes would have likely avoided the dispute in Greene. There,
the self-help provision at issue read:
Notwithstanding this arbitration agreement, the Parties retain the right to
exercise self-help remedies and to seek provisional remedies from a court,
pending final determination of the Dispute by the arbitrator. No Party
waives the right to elect arbitration of a Dispute by exercising self-help
remedies, filing suit, or seeking or obtaining provisional remedies from a
court.143
To avoid contention, the following is a suitable alternative:
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All Parties retain the right to exercise alternative remedies, including selfhelp and seeking provisional remedies from a court. If a Party exercises
these non-arbitral remedies, that Party waives the right to arbitrate any
dispute arising under this agreement.
Furthermore, the ability to amend, modify or revoke the arbitration agreement
must only be offered where the consent of all parties would be required to validate the
change and where all parties have an equal right to propose such changes. The deficient
provision in Baker is illustrative:
[The employer has] the right to amend, modify or revoke this agreement
upon thirty (30) days' prior written notice to the Employee.144
The drafter ought to have either eliminated the provision or changed it to:
Each party has the right to propose amendments, modifications or
revocation of this agreement. Such changes shall take effect upon written
consent of all parties. All parties must consent within (30) days of any
proposed amendment, modification or revocation.
In summary, each provision of the arbitration agreement must be congruent with
all others and embody a unified instrument. Accordingly, provisions that undermine the
mutual promise to arbitrate should be reviewed, re-written, and harmonized with the
remainder of the agreement.
3.   Equitable Estoppel
Special difficulties exist in drafting an arbitration agreement that undermines or
supports an equitable estoppel claim. This is because, in cases where equitable estoppel is
asserted, there is often either no written agreement or a contrary written agreement.
However, the circumstances of Flintkote145 imply some appropriate suggestions.
First, if a main contract governing the parties’ relationship exists, the contract
permits amendments or modifications, and one party’s actions suggest amenability to
arbitration, then the party desiring arbitration ought to amend the main contract by adding
an arbitral clause. Second, if there is a separate contract requiring litigation, then the
drafter can include a provision stating that certain enumerated acts suggesting a desire to
arbitrate will bind a party to arbitration and void the original agreement. Any such
provision must be written clearly and with sufficient specificity to avoid complicating the
existing contracts. If these steps are taken, reliance on equitable estoppel to compel
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arbitration will likely become unnecessary. For example, in Flintkote,146 the supplier
could have provided that:
If any Party acts inconsistently with its intent to resolve disputes in a
judicial forum, that Party waives its right to such forum and must submit
all future disputes to final and binding arbitration. “Acting inconsistently”
includes aligning with other entities or individuals subject to an arbitration
agreement and participating in dispute resolution processes governed by
an agreement that mandates arbitration in later phases of a dispute.
B.  Ambiguity/Otherwise Poorly Written Clauses
Clarity and consistency are essential when drafting the arbitration agreement. As
such, each provision should be written clearly, consistently, and with a singular meaning.
In PCH,147 where the arbitral clause used permissive language in one sentence and
compulsory language in the next, the drafter could have simply employed consistent
language throughout the agreement reflecting the nature of the parties’ intent to arbitrate.
Additionally, the drafter should test the application of provisions when reviewing
unfinished versions of the arbitration agreement to ensure that each provision produces
rational results. If the parties in Grelu Consulting148 had done this, they would have
discovered the bizarre panel that their arbitrator-selection provision created. Furthermore,
the drafter and all parties to the contract will be well-served if overcomplicated clauses
are excluded from the agreement. Recall that the relevant text of the agreement in Grelu
Consulting, Inc. stated that:
[e]ach party shall appoint one . . . arbitrator, and such arbitrator shall
appoint another arbitrator . . . [and] the decision of [a] majority of such
arbitrators . . . shall be conclusive upon the parties.149
The court resolved the dispute by pluralizing two words, finding that “party” was
synonymous with “side,” and in so doing imposed a three-member panel. A simpler
alternative that achieves the same result reads:
Each side in the dispute shall appoint one arbitrator. The arbitrators
appointed by each side shall then jointly appoint one arbitrator. The
decision of a majority of this three-member panel of arbitrators shall be
conclusive upon all parties.
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Finally, the arbitration agreement should definitively provide that the signatory
forfeits the right to a trial by assenting to the contract and state the types of claims subject
to arbitration.
C.  Excess of Authority
An arbitrator could improperly exceed his or her authority in spite of the content
of the arbitration agreement. Nevertheless, the arbitration agreement should specify at a
minimum, the types of disputes the arbitrator can decide and the classes of persons bound
by the arbitral award. If the agreement includes this language, it is less likely that the
arbitrator will overstep his contractually imposed boundaries in these respects. This is
because blatant violation of the agreement probably will not withstand judicial scrutiny.
For instance, the following provision defining the scope of the arbitrator’s authority
would have been valuable in Leshin:150
The arbitrator’s decision shall be final and binding upon each party in the
capacity in which he acts under this agreement.
An even simpler alternative would have been:
The arbitrator shall have no power whatsoever to bind any trustee who is a
party to this agreement in his individual capacity.
IV.  

CONCLUSION

The arbitral process is invaluable for resolving civil disputes. The arbitration
agreement plays an integral role in ensuring that arbitration functions efficiently and
expeditiously. Accordingly, the drafter of the arbitration agreement must avoid drafting
errors that could undermine the parties’ recourse to arbitration, prolong the dispute
resolution process, or cause the parties unnecessary expense.
In recent cases, drafting mistakes relating to unconscionability, lack of mutuality,
equitable estoppel, ambiguity, poor writing, and excess of authority have caused
contention among parties to arbitration agreements. Examination of these cases reveals
that the issues could have been prevented if the drafters had employed certain strategies
when writing the agreement. Learning from these mistakes, understanding why they were
so costly, and implementing the appropriate drafting techniques to avoid similarly
undesirable outcomes is invaluable for drafters of future arbitration agreements.
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